Thames Water’s Rescue Deal Comes With a Dirty Catch
The saga of financially distressed Thames Water may have reached a new low. The Financial Times and others reported that the latest US bidder for the utility planned to up its bid by £ 1 billion if the government would lay off pollution mitigation requirements until 2030. Sort of, “We’ll pay you if you let us continue to dump sewage into the waterways.” (We say latest bidder because US investment firm KKR made an unsuccessful bid not long ago.)
We’d rate the Thames privatization and subsequent deterioration as one of the worst utility deals in living memory for customers. It is a model of what not to do, and relevant to the entire public service sector— gas. electric and water.
Critics point to the £7 billion of dividends paid to shareholders since privatization as the source of the financial difficulties, which misses the point. Well-run utility companies can pay big dividends as long as they constitute a sustainable percentage of earnings and the company retains the ability to raise new money when needed to meet its public service responsibilities. However, considering the huge negative equity position that resulted and the long history of fines for violating environmental requirements, we must conclude that Thames’ dividend policy met neither requirement. But, private equity investors often require that the companies in which they invest issue huge amounts of debt, then take the cash out of the company via dividends, and leave the company with not much equity and a lot of debt. The story, here, is not that they did it, but that the regulator, OFWAT, didn’t intervene.
ADVERTISEMENT
Aficionados of gangster movies might see in this epic similarities to a crime scene (a “bust out”) as in “Goodfellas”. In that thriller, the mafia takes over a legal business, destroys it financially, and then burns it down to collect the insurance proceeds. Change a few nouns and eliminate the big fire scene at the end, and the story sort of resembles what appears to have happened here: previous management ransacks the balance sheet, loads the company with so much debt that it is no longer financially viable and needs rescue.
What next? Well, having witnessed almost thirty-five years of basically neo-liberal misrule of the regulatory environments, the question is what changes. Our answer is not much, but maybe two things. First, the cost of financing the water company’s assets could substantially increase under new hedge fund management unless the creditors take a huge haircut on their debt. The new buyers will expect to earn a decent return on their capital, probably in the 10-12% range. This should be compared with a 4-5% rate (on 10 year gilts) if the government chooses to re-nationalize the assets at a similar discount to asset value. Big difference. The second change, management, is harder to evaluate. It is possible that levels of operating performance and financial management could be improved by new hedge fund owners. The bar is fairly low here.
There is a soccer term in the UK, bend it like Beckham. We might adjust this to the present circumstances and ask, will they buy it like Buffett? Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway owns a large portfolio of regulated utilities which are fairly conservatively managed. Will the new owners behave the same way? We have no idea. But the utter absence of government regulatory presence here remains a source of concern.
The Thames Water story is a cautionary tale about mixing motives to maximize profit with public service. It applies to all utility sectors. The huge investments required to electrify and serve AI will, no doubt, attract as many financial engineers as electrical engineers, so expect more. But don’t expect better results unless regulators pay attention.
This post appeared first on https://oilprice.com